Syracuse Scholar (1979-1991)
Volume 7
Issue 2 Syracuse Scholar Fall 1986

Article 3

9-15-1986

Problems in Development of Nationalism in India
Robert I. Crane

Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/suscholar

Recommended Citation
Crane, Robert I. (1986) "Problems in Development of Nationalism in India," Syracuse Scholar (1979-1991):
Vol. 7 : Iss. 2 , Article 3.
Available at: https://surface.syr.edu/suscholar/vol7/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Syracuse
Scholar (1979-1991) by an authorized editor of SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu.

Crane: Problems in Development of Nationalism in India

Problems in
Development of
Nationalism in
India
ROBERTI. CRANE

II

Robert I. Crane is Ford-Maxwell
Professor of South Asian History at
Syracuse University. Before coming to
Syracuse, he served as professor of history and director of the South Asia
Program at Duke University. Crane
received his Ph .D. from Yale University
in 1951 and from 1963 to 1968 served as
editor of the Journal of Asian Studies.
He has been a fellow of the American
Council of Learned Societies, the Social Science Research Council, and the
American Institute ofindian Studies as
well as of the U.S. Educational Foundation in India. Crane has written and
edited several books and many of his
articles have appeared in scholarly
journals and anthologies.

R.I. Cashman, The Myth of the
Lokamanya (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1975) 1.
1.
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N 10DAY'S WORLD, political leaders often fuce the task of
unifying and building nations. Fostering national unity requires action along several lines: creating a broadly based sense of common cultural heritage, strengthening agreement on shared, national goals, and
increasing national, as opposed to regional, loyalty. These tasks require
rigorous leadership and commitment, as well as the curbing of divisive
elements in structure and other areas. Some of these elements are of
long standing and may reflect basic features of the societies in question . Divisive tendencies in fact serve to increase the primacy of effective measures to forge unity. Historically, myths have been used to
achieve this. In this context, the word myth is used, as R I. Cashman
puts it,
in the anthropological sense . .. it may be defined as the <tar;ge) controlling imagr!. . .founded in ma~s experience) and which forms an essential element of a group state of mind or consciousness. A myth reflects
the manner in which a community . . .defines itselfvis-a-vis the present)
its past history) and future prospects. ... It is a poweiful construct because it represents the sum ofwhat agroup wants to believe about itself 1
In this sense, myths may serve to draw on favorable societal traits and
to mobilize the public around requisite symbols, uniting the publicor at least major strata thereof-in support of stated goals?
Nationalism may also be viewed as a movement of collective behavior that becomes, in a given society, overtly important in a particular milieu and at a certain point in time. That raises for the social
historian the analytical question, "... why do collective episodes occur
where they do, when they do, and in the ways they do?" N.J. Smelser,
who posed this question, seeks to answer it in his Theory of Collective
Beha~

Nationalism is by no means a recent phenomenon, dating back as
it does at least to the American and French Revolutions. The past fifty
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years have been host-or hostage-to a proliferation of the movements
of collective behavior we label "nationalism." Since the end of World
War II, we have witnessed many such movements-frequently traumatic at least in their inception- in a variety of new nations. Despite
the evident importance of these movements, the level of analysis to
which they have normally been subjected remains at best inadequate.
A survey of extant literature on nationalism in the non-Western world
suggests the sway of idiosyncratic and anecdotal accounts, too ofren
subjective in character or couched in elusive phrases, that imply that
collective behavior "flows from sources beyond empirical evaluation."4
It is not my intention to deny the rich and variegated complexity
of the social process or of the social milieu in which the collective movement we call "nationalism" unfolds. Nor do I suggest that all or most
nationalist movements originate from the same materials or the same
social experiences. Each unfolds within a discrete and in some ways
unique historical setting. Each reflects the past circumstances and distinctive history of the society that has produced it. At the same time,
such movements are not "spontaneous;' nor are they predominantly
idiosyncratic. Collective movements reftect the social process that spawns
and shapes them. Changes in the external environment, in relevant
structural characteristics, in the stresses and pressures to which the group
is subjected, or in the kinds of "repression" the movement faces, all
help to shape the development of the movement from stage to stage.
The process, though complex, is by no means whimsical. Since major
problems in the contemporary international scene clearly involve nationalist movements in present or potential conflict, it is important to
grasp their antecedents, their characters, and their implications for interstate relations. It is also necessary to come to grips with their dynamics.

A

~ Congress, progenitor of Indian nationalism, was founded.

HUNDRED YEARS AGO, in r88s, the Indian National

The first annual session of the National Congress took place in Bombay-India's second largest city-during the final week of the year.
Seventy-two delegates from all parts of the Indian Empire assembled
to proclaim their nationalist creed, to enunciate their grievances, and
to demand redress. Born in a colony, under the autocratic and unrepresentative rule of a foreign power, the Congress expressed anticolonial grievances amid declarations of national unity and of a fervent
desire for national progress and well-being.5
Concerning the growth of anticolonial nationalism in Asia and
Africa, H. Brasted observes that

Elie Kedmtrie and other political analysts have argued that as nationalism
was «conceived'' and elaburated in Europe, the seed ofself-determination
was transplanted in India through a muvement anti-pathetic to Empire. Hence, Indians disappointed and disillusioned with British rule
were enabled to embrace an ideology that restored their self-esteem and
which legitimized and channelled their disaffection.6

https://surface.syr.edu/suscholar/vol7/iss2/3

On politicization and political
mobilization processes, see R. I. Crane,
ed . , Aspects ofPolitical Mobilization in
South Asia (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse
University: South Asia Program, 1976).
See also Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development;'
American Political Science Review 55
(1961): 493-514. Deutsch brought the
modern study of processes of social
and political mobilization to a new
level of effectiveness.
2.

3. N. ]. Smelser, TheoryofCollective &havim- (New York: Free Press, 1962) 1.

Smelser, Collective &haviur. See in
particular chapters one, nine, and ten.

4·

5· For discussion and evaluation of the
origins and growth of Indian nationalism in the period prior to World War I,
seeP. C. Ghosh, The Deve/Qpmentofthe
Indian National Omgress, 1892-1909,
2nd ed. (Calcutta: K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1985); Sumit Sarkar, Modern India, 1885-1947 (Bombay: Macmillan
India, Ltd., 1985); ]. T. McLane, Indian
Nationalism and the Early Omgress
(Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1977); R. N . Aggarwala, National Movement and Constitutional Deve/Qpment of
India (Delhi: Metropolitan Book Company, 1956); R. C. Majumdar, Histury of
the Freedom Movement in India (Calcutta: K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1962),
vol. 1; K. K. Datta, Renaissance, Nationalism and Social Change in Modern India
(Calcutta: Bookland Ltd., 1965); A.
Pare!, "Hume, Dufferin and the Origins of the Indian National Congress;'
journal ofIndian Histury 42, pt. m, no.
126 (December 1964) : 707-15; R.I.
Crane, "The Leadership of the Congress Party;' in Leadership and Political
Institutions in India, ed. R. L. Park and
I. Tinker (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1959), 169-87; R. I.
Crane, "Problems of Writing Indian
History;' in Problems ofHistorical Writing in India, ed. S. Gopal (New Delhi:
India International Centre, 1963),

35-49 ·

2

Crane: Problems in Development of Nationalism in India
NATIONALISM IN INDIA-9

6. H . Brasted, "Indian Nationalist Development;' Modern Asian Studies I4,
no. I (I98o): 38. Brasted also argues that
Ireland's nationalism and anti-British
commitment played a major role in implanting similar sentiments in the
minds of receptive educated Indians.
He remarks that "Ireland consistently
did most to advertise the nationalist
idea and to demonstrate the means of
political mobilization .. :'(ibid.).
Without denying the importance of
European ideas and models, it is necessary to emphasize the local molding of
imported concepts to fit local conditions. This essay seeks to do that.
7. For more on the role and effects of
higher Western education among Indians in the nineteenth century, and
on its effect on the growth of nationalism, seeR. I. Crane, "The Transfer of
Western Education to India;' in The
Tmnsferofinstitutions, ed. W. B. Hamilton (Durham, N .C.: Duke University
Press, I964), 108-38. See also B. T.
McCully, English Education and the Origins ofIndian Nationalism (New York:
Columbia University Press, I94o); B.
M. Bhatia, Histury and Social Development (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House,
I974), vol. I, Elites in Modern India;
Barbara W. Flynn, "Indian Nationalist
Organization and Ideology, I883-I902:
the Imperial Government versus the
Western-educated Indians," (M.A. thesis, Duke University, Durham, N.C.,
I969); S. R. Mehrotra, Enm;gence of the
Indian National Congress (London :
Vikas Publishers, I97I); V. P.
Raghuvanshi, Indian National Murement and Thought (Agra: L. Agarwal,
I95I).
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Brasted's argument gains force from the fact that the founders and
leaders of the Indian National Congress were drawn almost entirely
from the ranks of the Westernized intelligentsia, products of the system of higher education brought into India by their British rulers. In
1857, the English East India Company, governing India under parliamentary supervision, established the new universities of Bombay, Calcutta,
and Madras, modelled on the University of London. These universities hastened the creation of the new, Western-educated class that formulated and propagated Indian nationalism?
It was, actually, the colonial system and regime in British India that
created the basis for Indian nationalism, producing the grievances and
the disillusionment that fed nationalism, and calling into being-for
its own purposes-the educated "middle class" among whom anticolonial nationalism spread. For at least thirty years after its birth in
1885, India's nationalist movement was led by men who rose to positions of some prominen'ce and relative affluence-via Western education- under British rule. A number of them were barristers or solicitors,
some were medical doctors, and some, subordinate officials serving under British administrators. A sprinkling of businessmen also took part,
many of whom had gained some wealth and status under British colonial rule yet were, for various reasons, dissatisfied with certain aspects
of colonial rule or with their prospects in a colonial economy. Educators and journalists from India's rapidly expanding indigenous press were
also among the movement's leaders.8 In fact, the press played a vital
role in the articulation and diffusion of nationalist ideas and programs.
The literate, Western-educated professional men-the Moderates as they
were then called-who led the Congress prior to World War I were adept
in use of press and platform to express their nationalist convictions and
their proposals for reform. The annual sessions of the National Congress were geared to press coverage and to the exposition of Congress
members' views on the leading public issues of the day.9 The meetings
of the Congress were extensively reported in the Indian-owned press,
along with allied topics of political concern. As noted, the vernacular
press diffused outward, in indigenous languages and local idiom, the
major nationalist themes expressed in English during the annual Congress sessions. This spread the "message" among a wider, popular following and also translated it into the local symbols and idioms of more
parochial audiences, unfamiliar, for the most part, with English language and culture. This was very important if the elite, English-educated
leaders of the movement were to secure popular support for their cause.
It was, in fact, vital to the growth of nationalism in India that the wide
gap between the English-educated leaders and the rank-and-file Indian
be bridged. Yet this problem continued to confront the Congress until at least the end of World War I and the rise to ascendancy after 1920
of Mohandas K. Gandhi. He transformed Indian nationalism into a
popular, mass-based movement.
The Moderates who founded the Congress asked for gradual reform
of the Indian administration through the increased participation of educated Indians in its upper levels and through an enlargement of the
"representative'' Indian element in the nascent legislative councils. They
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also sought by petition to win a voice in the budget and an increase
in the very limited powers of the legislative councils (whose members
were largely nominated by the government) .

II

N ADDffiON 10 these basic goals, the Moderate leaders sought
piecemeal reform on a varied list of constitutional issues (including
an extension of the right of trial by jury to all Indians and a separation
of the executive and judicial powers of the Indian Civil Service) and
on certain administrative issues. They hoped such "boons" from the
Supreme Government would ameliorate the conditions in British India that they found objectionable.
The Moderate leaders-men like Pherozeshah Mehta, G. K. Gokhale, or Mahadev Govind Ranade-were uniformly constitutionalists,
committed to step-by-step reform. Many prominent Moderates, including K. T. Telang, argued that Indian society had to be reformed
to enable an "enlightened" public to qualify-at some future date-for
political responsibility. The Moderate-led Congress was, in fact, an exemplar of the "norm-oriented" collective protest movement as defined
by Neil Smelser.10
In the theory of collective protest movements, the norm-oriented
nwvement is characterized by an abiding commitment to the detailed,
gradual reform of existing institutions through constitutional means.
Such a movement exhibits no interest in a basic transformation of existing institutions. There are, in this theoretical construct, several distinct types of collective movement, each with its own antecedents, values,
goals, and traits, and each arising and being fostered by a particular
context. This construct presupposes that collective protest movements
are multi-causal, and identifies a variety of causal factors drawn from
complex social experience. The richness of this multi-causal theory is
particularly useful in dealing with a nationalist movement that-almost
by definition-had to endeavor to be "all things to all men."
The theory posits that for a collective movement to arise, the interaction of certain conditions, functioning within what is called a valueadded process, is crucial. A value-added process is a process of development and chapge in which each stage in the growth of a movement
of collective behavior acts as a necessary precondition for the next stage.
In a value-added process one moves from more general delimiting features and conditions toward more specific ones. Each step in the process
eliminates certain alternatives and creates more specific constraints for
the remaining viable alternatives. Because each step in a value-added
process serves as a necessary precondition for the next, analysing an
actual social movement in this way enables us to ascertain its most likely
outcomes and to grasp the factors that facilitated its course of development.
A variety of conditions (among them, strain, conduciveness, social
control mechanisms, and techniques and modes of communication)
are crucial in determining the thrust and shape of a movement of collective behavior. Of these, the presence of strain, or stress, in the soci-
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8. The number, circulation, and influence of indigenous newspapers grew
rapidly in British India after 1875. Most
of the vernacular papers and some of
the English language ones were owned
and edited by educated Indians. A
majority espoused nationalist
grievances and objectives, while some
actively supported the National Congress or other nationalist organizations.
See R. I. Crane, "The Press and Local
Associations as Manifestations of
Change in Late Nineteenth Century
Calcutta;' in Urban India, ed . G. R.
Gupta (New Delhi: Vikas Publishers,
1983), 193-221. See also Government of
Bengal, "Particulars of Newspapers
Published in the Lower Provinces and
Assam in the Year 1886;' (Confidential)
National Archives ofindia; and W. H.
Morris Jones, The Guvernment and Politics ofIndia, 3rd ed. (New York: Hillary, 1971).

9. Syracuse University's Bird Library
holds on microfilm the complete,
printed proceedings of the annual
meetings of the Indian National Congress, 1885-1906. The annual proceedings, including all resolutions adopted,
were uniformly in English . Most resolutions addressed specific reform
proposals for the administration of
British India.
10. Smelser, Collective &haviur, 270-312.
A nmm-uriented movement is defined as a
political movement dedicated to the
peaceful, piecemeal reform of existing
institutions in a desirable direction.
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ety is viewed as fundamental. Strain alone, however, does not necessarily lead to growth of a movement of collective behavior. Nor does
strain lead to a particular type of collective behavior. Other relevant conditions, in a given context, lead the movement toward one or another
specific outcome. Conditions of conduciveness, (for example, structural
features) predispose the course of a movement's development along
one path or another. Therefore, in studying a movement of collective
behavior, it is necessary to investigate both the kinds of strains that
have called the movement into being and the character of the structural features that shape the conduciveness exhibited by the social context within which the value-added process has to function.
The presence of other facilities can also help determine a movement's
particular path of development. Extant facilities for political mobilization constitute an important conditioning factor in shaping collective
movements. These facilities include the kinds of media available for
diffusing ideas or prescriptions for action. In the study of collective
movements, basic issues arise regarding the "mix" of elements of strain,
types of conduciveness, the character of the facilities at hand, and the
nature of the social and political controls faced by the movement.

l

11. Smelser, Colkctive Behavior, 313-18,
326-29, 365-67. On such movements

for total transformation, see M. Barkun, Crucibk of the Millenium (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press,
1986) for a most insightful study of one
major variety of the value-oriented
movement that seeks to transform and
radically change the existing system.
Noteworthy strains of this variety of
collective movement were expounded
by some of the prominent leaders of
the Extremist wing oflndian nationalists during the early years of this century, especially Sri Aurobindo.
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1 ~g

r:E THEORY OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR, inc!ud-

its central analytical concept of the value-added process, holds
that a particular "mix" of conditioning factors will transform a normoriented movement into a value-uriented one, fundamentally altering
its course. If, for example, the socially accepted agencies of control suppress a norm-oriented movement, that suppression-if vigorous
enough-materially facilitates transformation of the norm-oriented
movement into a value-oriented movement. The latter, quite unlike
a norm-oriented movement, is committed to a total overthrow of the
existing regime, a deposition of existing dominant values in favor of
new ones.
When a norm-oriented collective movement changes into a valueoriented movement the transformation is fundamental. The normoriented movement devotes its energies to diagnosing shortcomings
in the existing system so as to riform the system in ways believed to
be desirable. The value-oriented movement abandons interest in reform and leapfrogs past improvement to the creation of a new order.
The "new" order, of course, may be the revival or reassertion of a
vanished order, now reconstituted as the "ideal" way to order things.11
The issues posed by collective movement theory illuminate our understanding of the development of nationalism in India. The stresses
underlying many Indians' dissatisfaction and disillusionment reflected
the increasingly obvious disparity between colonial rhetoric and actual
practice, as well as an increase in the weight of colonial domination.
Moreover, colonial rule called into question basic traditional values and
beliefs oflndian society. Western education, in particular, alienated its
recipients, to some extent at least, from traditional norms and values.
This caused or encouraged, among other things, a loss of self-esteem,
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a decline of confidence in long-established values, and the diminution
or loss of group solidarity. These strains threatened basic social organization and equilibrium. Nationalism, it is posited, offered a "solution"
for these strains, because nationalism reasserted and proclaimed the
virtue-if not the rightful superiority-of the group under foreign domination.
Colonial rule created a framework of laws, codes, procedures, and
opportunities for Indians. The conditions imposed by British rule within the political and administrative realm, as well as on the Indian
economy, were crucial to the growth oflndian nationalism. Colonialism shaped the arena for politics and also many of the goals and expectations of the National Congress. The Moderates, of course, sought
reform and progress along lines derived from British political thought
and practice. They had no desire to change the system itself, asking
instead for a larger and more effective voice for educated Indians in the
governing institutions of British India. "Indianization" of the superior
services (the Indian Civil Service, recruited in London) and of the nascent legislative bodies were prime desiderata for them .

]D

URING THE LAST THREE DECADES ofthenine-

teenth century, imperial and colonial rivalries in the world
at large increased perceptibly. These rivalries were aggravated by growing competition among major industrial powers for markets and for
assured sources of essential raw materials. Great Britain's previously unchallenged industrial and maritime supremacy was undermined. As a
consequence, Britain's own economic dependence upon a favored exploitative position in the Indian economy-and especially in tradegrew. The amount ofBritish capital invested in India-largely through
British Managing Agency Houses-also increased, and intensifYing imperial rivalries in Africa and Asia enhanced the significance of the Indian Army for imperial defense. All these things raised Britain's stake
in her control of India.
The growing sense of the importance of "empire'' and of the need
for resolute defense of British imperial interests-so vital a fuctor in the
Second Afghan War-was accompanied by an increase in the number
of British nonofficials in India. Noticeable, in this context, was the substantial rise in the number and proportion of British wives and their
minor children resident in India. As numerous memoirs make clear,
the growing number of wives in India had, in its own way, a negative
effect on relations between the British and their Indian subjects, a fuct
painfully apparent in the Anglo-Indian uproar over the ill-futed Ilbert
Bill (a proposed amendment to the code of criminal procedure that
would have allowed an Indian magistrate to judge a criminal case involving a European).12
For a variety of reasons related to an enhanced sense of imperial mission (signalled by Queen Victoria's assumption of the title of Empress
oflndia), intensification of British imperial control over India was accompanied by the growth of racial discrimination against Indians. A
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12. The IIbert Bill controversy of 1883

clearly showed Indians the strength of
British intentions to keep them "in
their place." The storm over the bill
demonstrated not only the fear and
dislike of British residents for the Indians they ruled but also the extent to
which British administrators, including
senior members of the Indian Civil
Service, were prepared to overtly oppose equality and justice for Indians.
Overt discrimination against educated
Indians was further displayed when
Lord Salisbury lowered the maximum
age of candidates sitting for the civil
service examinations in London, a
measure flagrantly aimed at minimizing
the chances of success in the examinations for Indian candidates. Such
official acts, which also included Lord
Lytton's discriminatory Arms Act and
Vernacular Press Act, laid bare British
opposition to measures meant to give
Indians equality before the law and
equal opportunity as subjects of the
Crown . The pages of the vernacular
press give ample evidence of the growing bitterness among literate Indians
over these British government policies.
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13. For a keen and insightful discussion

of this growing racism and of the link
between racism and colonial exploitation, see Rajat K. Ray, Social Conflict
and Political Unrest in &ngal, 1875-1927

(Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1984),
17-19, 21-29, 49-50, 95-105.

14. For a discussion of declining oppor-

tunities, increasing discrimination, and
the growth in the ranks of the Western
educated that sought those dwindling
opportunities, see R. I. Crane, "The
Transfer of Western Education to India;' in The Transfer ofInstitutions, ed.
W. B. Hamilton (Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 1964), 108-38. See also
R. I. Crane, "Divergent Developments
in Indian Nationalism, 1895-1905;' in
Stndies on Asia, 1962, ed. R. Sakai (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska
Press, 1962), 1-15. The Report of the
Government oflndia, Sedition Committee, 1918, Annexure 2, gives figures
on "persons convicted of revolutionary
crimes or killed in the commission of
such crimes, 1907-1917 ."The great
majority of such persons were be/Qw 30
years of age; almost 90 percent came
from the bhadrawk (higher castes), and
almost all were students, clerks, unemployed, or holders of"white collar"
posts. In Bengal, the bhadralok at that
time comprised about .05 percent of
the population . The Report makes it
apparent that at least the most militant
section of the Extremist movement
was drawn heavily from among the
lower economic echelon of the respectable bhadralok. The "passport" of
Western education had given this
group neither rank nor influence in the
modern sector of the colonial society.
Inflation cut into its members' very
meager salaries.
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corollary of increased exploitation, this discrimination was exacerbated
by growing friction between the Western-educated Indians and their
British rulers. The collegiate curriculum in British India was, of course,
based upon the curriculum of British universities, and inculcated core
British values. Imbued with these ideas, Western-educated Indians began to assert their "rights" as British subjects, calling for equal treatment in employment and promotion and equaliry before the law. As
Raj at Ray points out in his Social Conflict and Political Unrest in &ngal,
I875-1927, instances of overt racism in the High Court ofJustice were
particularly offensive to Indians. The vernacular press is rife with reports
of European assaults upon Indians and of miscarriages of justice in
magistrates' courts. As Ray makes clear, the European commercial community relied on the magistrates' courts to rule in their favor in any
dispute with the natives. The Indian press complained of this bitterly.
Overt racism led to Indian countermeasures, and conflict fed the fires
of militancy in nationalist ranks.13
The assertion oflndian "rights" offended and alarmed many Europeans and increased the frequency of racial brawls. It was, however,
the discrimination in employment, stifling their opportunities and frustrating their expectations, that most upset Indians.14
Earlier in the century it had appeared that doors were opening and
opportunities mounting for Indians. After about 1875, however, it became painfully apparent that the increasing numbers of Westerneducated Indians were competing for fewer and fewer opportunities.
Professional and/or entrepreneurial elites ran into growing blockages
and tightening limitations upon their career advancement. Dwindling
opportunities and increased competition for the openings that were
available heightened frustration and resentment in an environment of
growing racial animosity. There were, of course, still collaborators among
the Indians, those who benefitted from their engagement as agents of
the British. Similarly, among the professional classes-called into being by British rule and Western education- there were the successful
men whose status and emoluments depended largely upon British favor.
There were also the Indian princes, notables, and great landlords
(Zamindars or Talukdars) whose status and interests virtually dictated
dependence on British rule and British law. These segments oflndian
society profited from British rule and clung to it. Political and economic
trends after about 1875, however, severely limited the number of Indians who could become "collaborators;' except as clerks or subordinate
office assistants. The rise from humble origins to rich and powerful positions that had not been uncommon before the Indian Mutiny came
to be a rarity after 1875.

II

N ADDITION 10 THE overt changes in conditions and environment that faced Indians (especially Western-educated ones) after 1875, a related series of changes took place in the economic position
of India and in Indian economic relations with Great Britain and the
world economy. These shifts in secular economic trends began about
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1873 and affected not only India's economic relations with the rest of
the British Empire, but also its domestic economy. In both areas, the
changes for India and its people were for the worse. The hardening
of British colonial policy vis-a-vis India-summarized briefly abovewas closely linked to these secular trends as well as to enhanced imperial rivalries among the industrial powers.
For reasons that had very little if anything to do with India, a major
change in the international economic order took place after 1873. In
that year, the world market price of silver began a significant decline.
The value of the Indian silver rupee therefore fell vis-a-vis£ sterling.
In 1880, the rupee was worth 20.3/sd.; by 1892, it was worth only 14-.5/8d,
and soon thereafter, it fell as low as 12.5/8d. This depreciation of the
rupee had significant-at times traumatic-effects on the Indian economy and especially on its vital import-export trade. The cost of manufactured goods imported into India (largely from the United Kingdom)
increased. The Indian consumer had to pay more rupees for manufactured goods. At the same time, the value in the world market of Indian exports of raw materials fell, earning less foreign exchange.
Intensifying the negative effects of the depreciation of the silver rupee
were the uncertainty and instability caused by the fluctuations in the
value of silver. This uncertainty had particularly strong effects on importexport trade. At times the short-run fluctuations and government efforts
to prevent the continuing decline in the value of the rupee virtually
paralyzed India's trade.
These changes hurt India in other important ways, too. The Government of India had large sterling liabilities in London. These sterling
obligations included the "Home Charges" of the Government of India (G.O.I.). In 1872-73, these Home Charges cost the G.O.I. Rs. 16.6
crom. In 1894--95, the Home Charges cost the G.O.I. Rs. 28.9 crores.15
This great increase in these payments put the Indian treasury and the
Indian taxpayer at a distinct disadvantage. Not only could the burden
of Home Charges not be reduced, it actually increased because the
G.O.I. bowed to the pressure of the Indian Civil Service and granted
its members an Exchange Compensation Allowance that artificially
raised the sterling value of their rupees to protect their pensions and
allowances. The fall in the value of the rupee and the fluctuations in
value so reduced receipts from Indian exports that the government had
only a limited ability to meet its sterling obligations. In addition, the
full in the value of the rupee retarded British investment in India, causing
India to pay a higher price for imported British capital.16
In 1893, under pressure from the Secretary of State for India, the
government of India decided on official action to stem the fall in the
value of the rupee and to fix an arbitrary rate of exchange. The official
ratio was fixed at 16d. to Rs.1, though the market price was then 14-d.
This was a radical change in currency policy. It eased the burden of
the Home Charges on the Indian treasury and improved the situation
of the Indian Civil Service. However, the new official rate of exchange
required changes in the money supply. The government mints were
closed and the amount of rupee currency in circulation was reduced.
The resulting monetary "stringency" caused the Indian bank rate to
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15.

A C1ll1r equals 10 million rupees.

16. The adverse effects of the f.ill in the

value of the rupee for Indians and the
Indian economy are discussed in P. L.
Malhotra, Administration ofUmi E!!Jin
in India, 1894-99 (New Delhi: Vikas
Publishers, 1979), 1-32, and Amiya K.
Bagchi, Private Investment in India,
1900-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1972). N . K. Sinha, in
his Economic Histury ofBengal (Calcutta:
K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1962), provides a
valuable account of major trends and
developments. The vernacular press
became increasingly bitter toward British economic policies and the actions
of the government ofind.ia that
harmed Indian interests for imperial
purposes. See also B. G. Gokhale, "Maharashtriyan Responses to the British
Presence;' in British Imperial Policy in
India and Sri Lanka, r8s8-1912, ed. R.
Crane and N. G. Barrier (Columbia,
Mo.: South Asia Books, 1981), 164-79.
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17. For a discussion of the famine of
1896-97, see Malhotra, AdministmtWn

oflmd E{gin, 106-+4. For an exhaustive
study, see B. M. Bhatia, Famines in India (Bombay: Asia Publishers, 1963). It
must be noted that government handling of the famines conformed to no
monolithic official pattern, except for
the obsession with a free market. Local
governments, not to mention individual civil servants, varied in the
efficiency and scope of their efforts.
The results were relatively uneven,
though in practice government frequently erred on the side of"too little
too late." The vernacular press severely
criticized government management of
the famines, particularly in the light of
substantial increases in military expenditures. Large numbers of famine
deaths, widely reported by the vernacular press, shook faith in government and increased a growing sense of
indignation. There seems little doubt
that these grave strains propelled nationalism toward a value-oriented
movement favoring the rise of Extremism.
18. See Malhotra, AdministmtWn of Imd
E{gin, 33-67, for a sound discussion of

the cotton duties issue. He makes very
explicit the role of Manchester in
demanding abolition of all duties and
the imposition of countervailing excises on Indian cloth or yarn over the
objections of the governor-general.
The injustice was so obvious that it
gave Indians a major weapon in their
attack upon the hostile attitude of the
British.
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shoot up from 3 percent in 1893 to 9 percent in 1896, while domestic
prices rose and people on fixed incomes suffered.
In the same period, the government also greatly increased its military expenditures, beginning in 1878 with the vastly expensive Second
Afghan War, widely denounced by Indians as a wasteful and counterproductive enterprise foisted upon the people. This was followed in
1886 by a costly war to annex Upper Burma, also paid for by Indian
taxpayers and fought by the Indian Army for imperial purposes. In
1893-94, the government spent large sums in what was officially called
the "pacification" of the northwest frontier. New, large-scale frontier
expeditions were launched in 1897, once again demanding heavy expenditures. The latter cost the Indian taxpayer Rs. 5 crores.
The great increase in military expenditure in a period of fulling rupee
values (and attendant disruption of export-import trade, monetary stringency, and rising cost of living) coincided with three severe famines,
the third being by far the worst. Government famine policy was circumscribed by the official obsession with laissez-faire) crippling any
efforts to ameliorate the tragedy. The doctrinaire unwillingness of the
government to import food or intervene in the market to inhibit soaring prices caused untold, needless suffering. Moreover, the government's
famine relief operations were niggardly and tardy, and its famine relief
workers were themselves paid substandard "wages." The pathetic conditions prevailing in large areas during each famine and the tardy, limited
nature of government relief efforts threw into glaring relief the gap between daily reality and British professions of the beneficent nature of
their rule. Government shortcomings, bureaucratic rigidities, and meanness in applying relief provisions convinced many Indians of the government's callous indifference to starvation and destitution and confirmed
their belief that foreign rule was harmful.17
Nor was this all. During the same difficult years acrimonious debates erupted between London and Calcutta over the imposition of
duties and excises on cotton goods.18 This unseemly controversy was
provoked by Britain's demand that the Indian government eliminate
all duties on British cotton goods imported into India-the official justification being, of course, free trade. The real reason for the demand
was that Parliament and the secretary of state for India were under pressure from the powerful cotton manufacturing interests of Britain's midlands, including Lancashire and the city of Manchester. When the
government of India, desperately in need of revenues due to the fall
in the value of silver, tried to resist London's demand, it was curtly
and flatly overruled by the secretary of state. Desperate, the government then applied a nominal 3'-h percent duty and was ordered by London to fix a countervailing 3'-h percent excise on all cotton goods
manufactured in India so there could be no possibility of any "protection" for Indian goods. This blatant sacrifice of Indian economic interests served to convince even doubting Indians that justice or equity
could not be expected from the British. Even senior figures in the
government criticized this sacrifice oflndian interests as impolitic, unfair, and unwise. Again, the vernacular press criticized the policy of the
government severely, voicing rising disillusionment with foreign rule.
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The final straw, however, may well have been the government's response
to outbreaks of bubonic plague in 1897 in Bombay and Poona. Drastic
steps were taken to minimize the threat, including the segregation of
suspected plague victims in special camps and house-to-house searches
to identify and remove apparent victims. lroops were used in these
plague operations and in many cases their behavior in house searches
and in the removal of suspected victims violated all Indian norms of
acceptable behavior. The detention camps also violated social traditions
of considerable antiquity. In fact, all the measures were needlessly heavyhanded and arbitrary. Leaders of the Indian community who could
have allayed a public indignation that bordered on outrage were largely
ignored or brusquely set aside by the plague authorities. As a result,
substantial numbers of influential Indians were deeply offended by actions that violated deep-rooted customs. Two young Brahmin men,
who were members of a society for the protection of dharma (Hindu
religious-cum-social duty), assassinated two prominent plague officials
in Bombay. This event touched off further racist outbursts by the European community and their press, culminating in the trial and conviction for "sedition" of the Poona editor and nationalist leader, Bal
G. Tilak.19
The cumulative effect of the conditions and circumstances sketched
above was to create a context in which nationalism could develop. Indians, and in particular the educated strata, became increasingly
alienated from and bitter about British rule. And as the vernacular press
of the time clearly reflects, this disillusionment with the Raj began to
spread well beyond the Westernized intelligentsia. These mounting antiBritish feelings undermined the position, program, and leadership of
the staunch Moderates. To a growing number of nationalists, especially
the younger generation who had all too litde to gain under British rule
and very litde to lose, the "mendicancy'' of the Moderates seemed foolish and counterproductive. Crumbs from the British table could not
compensate for the cuffs that-all too often-accompanied any crumbs.
Emulation of the British increasingly seemed irrelevant if not pernicious. The optimism and fuith in British rhetoric that played so prominent a role in the oudook of the Moderates was increasingly replaced
by disillusioned bitterness.
The vernacular press served as a faithful mirror of this change, articulating and diffusing this new "message'' to a broader audience, including people of modest educational attainment not normally in a
position to associate directly with nationalist or Congress leaders. The
vernacular press, moreover, had a growing circulation in mufassal
towns-those in rural areas, away from the major cities that monopolized Congress activities-where nationalist politicization grew apace,
even if unevenly? 0

A

~ currency, the audience for them became increasingly recep-

S NATIONALIST IDEAS and convictions gained wider

tive, not only because the respectable strata found conditions of life
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19. For the murder of Rand and Ayerst
by the Chapekars and the subsequent
trial of Bal G. Tilak for "sedition;' see
Richard Cashman, The Myth of the
Lokamanya (Berkeley, Cal.: University
of California Press, 1975) . Cashman
gives a detailed account of the pioneer
efforts ofTilak in the politicization and
mobilization of popular religious festivals, mingling political and religious
symbols.

20. For the growth of the press in India, see R. I. Crane, "The Development of Nationalism in India in the
late Nineteenth Century: the Bengal
Press and Associations in the Diffusion
of Nationalism;' in Region and Nation
in India, ed. P. Wallace (New Delhi:
Oxford and IBH Publishing Company,
1985), 85-no; P. S. Khare, Growth of Press
and Public Opinion in India, r8s7-I9I8,
(Allahabad: Piyush Prakashan, 1964);
N . S. Bose, The Indian Awakening and
Bengal (Calcutta: K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1969); S. Banerjee, National
Awakening and the "Bangabasi" (Calcutta: Amitava-Kalyan Publishers,
1968); and S. P. Sen, ed. , The Indian
Press (Calcutta: Institute of Historical
Studies, 1967) . The chapter by
Tarasankar Banerjee, "The Growth of
the Press in Bengal vis-a-vis the Rise of
Indian Nationalism (1858-1905);' in
Sen, The Indian Press, 38-52, is particularly valuable for analysis of the close
relationship between press and nationalism. Annual reports on native papers
were prepared in each province by the
government, giving valuable summaries and details regarding the newpapers, their editors, and circulation
and editorial policies. They are available in the National Archives ofindia.
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See A. P. Mookerjee, Social and PIJlitical Ideas ofBipin Chandra Pal (Calcutta: Minerva Publications, 1974),

21.

49-58 .
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deteriorating but also because the threat to traditional symbols of group
identity was becoming more obvious. As less cosmopolitan segments
of the population were drawn within the ambit of the nationalist movement, the appeal of traditional values waxed and the influence of
Western values waned. This process, crucial to the growth of militancy,
requires much more study. Basic questions must be asked about the
meaning and significance oflndia's Extremist movement. Why did Extremism emerge as an important political movement in India? What
light does the growth of Extremism after 1893 shed on the development of the National Congress?
It is here suggested that frustration and disillusionment eroded belief in the legitimacy of foreign rule. Faith in the "promise" of British
rule was undermined. This loss of faith was particularly marked among
the segments of the Western-educated public that gained the least from
their involvement with alien values. The Moderates, men who had
adopted Western ways successfully and thrived under British rule,
pinned their hopes on reforms that would make Indians partners of
the British. But the Moderates were now challenged vociferously by
the militants, for whom foreign rule was iniquitous and illegitimate.
The change taking place can be seen in microcosm in the career of a
prominent Extremist leader, Bipin Chandra Pal. Pal began his political
career as an enthusiastic Moderate. In his maiden speeches at the second session of the Congress in 1886, Pal voiced typical Moderate belief
in the blessings of British rule.21 By 1900, however, events had transformed Pal into a prominent apostle of the "new" nationalism, fully
committed to winning freedom for India. Pal and his Extremist associates rejected out of hand basic Moderate strategy and tactics. In the
Extremist view not only was Moderate "mendicancy" futile, but it
meant the abasement oflndians. Militancy reflected the need to reassert pride in Indian culture and traditions and confidence in Indian
ability to guide the country to a better future, as well as the conviction
that "petitioning" was useless. The determination of Extremists to avoid
dependance on foreign ways and forge their own future was part of
the core of their movement. None of these ideas was new. From the
days of "Young Bengal" and the controversy then raised between the
orthodox and the Westernized innovators, these conflicting values had
been part of the scene. A new stage in confrontation had, however,
been reached by the 188os. The context discussed above fed the new
militancy and paved the way for the rupture between Moderates and
Extremists.
The ideas expressed by Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, Sri Aurobindo
Ghose, and Bal G. Tilak reflected the rise of Extremism . In 1881, Bankim
Chandra published his nationalist novel, Ananda Math . It inspired
Aurobindo, who drew upon it in his passionate Bhawani Mandir, and
also inspired the ideology of the 1905 swadeshi campaign. (Swadeshi,
meaning "one's own country;' was a key element of the campaign opposing the partition of Bengal. It signified use of Indian-made goods
only and the boycott of imported British goods.) Aurobindo made use
of the mantmm (a verse from sacred Hindu texts), "Bande Mataram"
(meaning "Hail to the Mother[land]"), from Bankim Chandra's novel,
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in his impassioned call to Extremism through the newspaper he edited,
the Bande Mataram. Both Aurobindo and Bal Tilak, at the same time,
drew upon the Bhagavad Gita, a major Hindu "scripture;' as a primary
source for their exposition of Extremist ideology.22 Whether drawing
upon Bankim Chandra's Ananda Math, or upon the Gita, the two
leaders stressed the themes of Extremism: militancy, self-reliance, and
the doctrine of action to remove obstacles. These themes, expressed
in terms redolent oflndian tradition, stimulated pride and self-esteem.
The marriage between militant political nationalism and Indian Hindu
tradition that was characteristic of the Extremist movement was bolstered by the ideas and tactics ofleaders like Bal Tilak and Sri Aurobindo.
Objective developments in the political scene also reinforced this bond,
however; Pansy C. Ghosh has summarized these circumstances nicely:
From 1892 to the introduction of the Morley-Minto refonns in 1909,
was a period of storm and unrest, in the process of which the Congress
itself underwent a metamorphosis . . .during it, the Congress was faced
with various questions, social, religious and economic and with problems
ofgurernmental policy. . . . Congress was also confronted with a crisis in
its development, which nearly brought an end to it.Z 3
The developments in question revolved partly around the highly
controversial subject of social reform in Indian society. The orthodox,
or conservative, portion of Indian society bitterly opposed social reforms that threatened established religion or religiously sanctioned customs. Much of the flammable opposition to such reform arose from
a basic belief that the foreign government had no right to "interfere"
in Indian traditional customs and in particular those backed by religion.
The Queen's Proclamation of 1858 had assured Indians that government
would not tamper with religion. That assurance reinforced the orthodox view that government had no right to intervene via legislation or
regulation. Some prominent Moderate leaders were, nonetheless, ardent social reformers. These Moderate leaders, pushing for social reforms they thought beneficial, on occasion sought or welcomed
government support and even legislation to further their goals. This
posture opened a major rift within the National Congress, between these
Moderates and those who opposed their reform projects. The rift
erupted in 1891 during heated controversy over the Age of Consent Bill.
This bill raised the legal minimum age for consummation of marriage
(or lawful sexual intercourse) for females from ten to twelve years of
age. Passage of the bill was urged by some prominent Moderates and
this enraged orthodox nationalists. "As a protest, Tilak organized public
meetings in different places ... articles in the Bangabasi, a weekly vernacular newspaper of Calcutta, against the Bill, led to the prosecution
of its proprietor, editor, manager and printer for sedition." 24 Passage
of the bill into law only increased the anger and widened the rift. And
for Tilak and the orthodox group, the fact that the day after the Congress adjourned, the National Social Conference (sponsoring social reform) held its annual meeting in the same panda[ used by the National
Congress added insult to injury. By 1895 the acrimonious controversy
over government involvement in social reform had forced Tilak to resign his Congress post. The split was exacerbated by ideological strife
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22. On these important ideological de-

velopments within Extremism, see: H.
and U. Mukherjee, Sri Aurobindo and
the New Thought in Indian Politics (Calcutta: K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1964); M.
A. Buch, Rise and Growth ofIndian
Militant Nationalism (Baroda: Atmaram Press, 1940); D. V. Tahmankar,
Lokamanya Tilak, Father ofIndian Unrest (London: J. Murray, 1956); S.
Mitra, The Liberator, Sri Aurobindo
(Bombay: Jaico Publishers, 1954); H.
and U. Mukherjee, Bipin Chandm Pal
and India's Struggle for Swamj (Calcutta:
University of Calcutta Press, 1958);
United Kingdom, Parliament, H.C.,
Religious Disturbances, vol. 63, no. 538
(1893); Sankar Ghose, The Renaissance to
Militant Nationalism in India (Bombay:
Asia Publishers, 1969); V. C. Joshi, ed.,
Sri Aurobindo, An Interpretation (Delhi:
Vikas Publishers, 1973) ; Cashman,
Lokamanya; R. I. Crane, "Calcutta in
the Nineteenth Century;' &ngal Past
and Present, pt. 2, no. 189 (Calcutta,
July-December 1980) : 105-30 . The India Office Library has a substantial
number of tracts and pamphlets
printed in English and in several vernaculars. Many of these were issued by
Extremist groups and individuals to
diffuse Extremist ideas and are a valuable source for the study of ideology.
The I.O.L. also has, as does the National Archives, copies of most issues
of Aurobindo's Extremist newspaper,
Bande Matamm, an invaluable source.
23. P. C. Ghosh, The Development of the
Indian National Omgress, I892-I90 9
(Calcutta: Firma K.L.M., 1970), 1.

24. Ibid., 66 .
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25 . Ibid., 71.

26 . Ibid., 71-73- See also Bimal Prased,
"The Congress Split at Surat;' in Studies
in Modern Indian History, Number One,
ed. B. R. Nanda and V. C. Joshi (Bombay: Orient Longrnans, 1972), 144-76,
for an excellent account of the ideas
crucial to major disagreements between
Moderates and Extremists. These
differences were in no way idiosyncratic; they reflect the effects of changes
in the socio-economic milieu that surround the process of national development.

27. The government oflndia decided
to partition the great province of Bengal in 1905, despite widespread and bitter opposition, and popular
demonstrations by masses of Bengalis.
Major nationalist and extremist politicalleaders, including Surendranath
Banerjea, B. C. Pal, and Aurobindo
Ghose, played prominent roles in mass
agitation and protest. The partition
was seen not only as a contemptuous
affront to Indian public opinion by an
arbitrary and unresponsive
bureaucracy, but also as a deliberate application of official "divide and rule"
policy. This was seen to be true in two
senses: the partition split Bengal into
two halves, thus separating nationalists
in western Bengal from nationalists in
eastern Bengal and weakening both
groups, and it also divided Hindumajority western Bengal from Muslimmajority eastern Bengal (now Bangladesh) , pitting the political leaders of
the two communities against each
other. A dramatic increase in religious
and political tensions and conflict followed. For a careful and detailed study
of the partition and its consequences,
see R. Cronin, British Policy and Administration in Bengal, 1905-1912, (Calcutta: Firma K.L.M. 1977) . (Dr.
Cronin received his Ph.D. in history
from Syracuse University. The dissertation was published soon after in Calcutta.) The partition itself spurred the
growth of militant and even terrorist
organization and protest as no other
event up to that time had done. In
that sense, it can be called a boon to
the militant nationalists, those most
adamant in their opposition to British
rule
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over other issues. In I893, Tilak transformed the annual Ganpati festival among Hindus from a household event into a public religious festival and occasion for community worship. This created an important
vehicle for nationalist agitation and mass politicization, using reigious
symbols. As P. C. Ghosh has so aptly commented:
The introduction of Ganapati festivals was an expression of Hindu
revivalism with a political aim . ... He [Tilak] became the pioneer in
urganizing a similar [to the Muslim Muharram festival] Hindu festival and together with his followers, set up five public Ganapati statues
in Poona . ... It has been suggested that in doing so) Tilak had two aims
... that it would be ofgood use fur anti-British propaganda and secondly, he hoped that the annual observance ofsuch a festival would help
to urganize the Hindu community. 25

~ A\

EANWHILE, DURING THE SAME YEARS in
\\various parts oflndia, a movement that came to be known
as the "Anti-cow-killing movement" had emerged among Hindus, especially those from the less-educated strata with very limited exposure
to Western values. The controversy over this spreading movement for
protection of the cow as sacred intensified the rift within the Congress,
as the Moderates in no way supported or approved the movement? 6
The anti-cow-killing movement demands close and serious study.
It was an important ideological and political development both because
it materially sharpened animosity, at times provoking riots between
Hindus and Muslims, and because it drove a serious wedge between
Moderates who deprecated the movement and its ideas and members
of the orthodox camp who supported the goals of the anti-cow-killing
campaign . The campaign also deserves study because it appeared to
have a broad, mass appeal among various classes of Hindus and could
serve as a mechanism for both social and political mobilization. Why
and how did this movement arise and spread so widely, attracting broad
Hindu support? Also, to what extent did the movement become a positive symbol of group identity and loyalty? Did apprehension about the
"threat" to traditional Hindu values give the cow protection movement
an important role as a "defensive mechanism"? Finally, did the support
for the anti-cow-killing movement contribute to the growth of Extremism as a viable popular movement? If so, in what ways?
By the outbreak of the first World War, or perhaps even sooner, the
fires of Extremism had died down. The peak years for the movement
were I905-09, during the vehement popular protests over the Partition of Bengal? 7 The ideals of Extremism, especially staunch opposition to government policy and the vital theme of self-reliance and
self-help, were epitomized by the swadcshi campaign (the boycott movement) and the development of "national education" to free Indians
from the denationalizing consequences of a British curriculum. With
the reunification of Bengal in I9II, the movement was robbed of its
most visible and potent issue.
As a result, extremism and vociferous nationalism waned? 8 In the
years between I893 and 1909, however-at the least-the militant, or
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Extremist, wing of Indian nationalism (accompanied by incidents of
terrorism directed against British officials in India) rose to prominence
in the political scene. Between 1905 and 1907, the Extremists tried to
capture the Congress Party from the Moderates. That challenge failed
and the Moderates were able to retain their control of the Congress
machinery for the time being. Significantly, the Extremists exhibited
all the hallmarks of a true value-oriented political movement in overt
contrast to the norm-oriented Moderates. Speaking in the name of
Hindu traditions and values, Extremist leaders demanded the expulsion of alien rule and alien values from Indian soil. They clearly sought
to transform the political scene and discourse of India in an Indian
idiom. In so doing, they reasserted traditional Hindu values and
denounced foreign ways of thinking and doing. They did not seek to
reform the system, rather to transform it. In their own way they anticipated the dynamic role of fundamentalist Islam in countries like Iran
today.
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28. Severe measures of repression by
the government oflndia, including detention without trial, quartering of
troops in "Extremist" strongholds,
summary expulsion of students from
colleges, hanging, and deportation, as
well as rigorous imprisonment for
those convicted of "sedition" or "disaffection;' and police firings, helped to
suppress Extremism . By 1909 the underground secret societies were badgered, relatively isolated, and infiltrated
by police informers. Terrorism was not
eliminated but draconian measures
greatly reduced its sway. In 1909, the
government also made concessions to
long-standing Moderate demands,
thus reinforcing the Moderates and
tending to rob the Extremists of some
of their ammunition . These measures
helped to reestablish, to some extent,
the credibility of the Moderates. Had
the conciliation of the Moderate
leaders been more wholehearted and
far-reaching, they might have been able
to reassert their norm-oriented policies
in a commanding fashion. Instead, the
concessions were, de facto, "too little
and too late."
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